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PANEL III
CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE

Remarks of Karinna Moskalenko*
community, including the efforts of our Center, the criminalization of torture by the Russian national Criminal Code has been
achieved. The truth is that the criminalization has not been applied much yet, but this is not because there is no torture—this
we do not believe—but because the way out of an authoritarian
state is a long and complicated one, and we are grateful to the
international community that this important step on the way has
been accomplished. At least there is recognition of the existence
of torture and of the notion that this crime is a corpus delicti
and thus those perpetrators who think that they are acting in the
best interest of the investigation, or the best interest of justice, or
the best interest of combating terrorism, at least now realize that
they are, in fact, criminals. As mentioned, this is a long process
but at least society now is aware of torture being a crime. This
awareness needs to be strengthened along with the use of international mechanisms and the implementation of the judgments,
of which, as I said, we have obtained plenty.

Introduction

F

irst of all, I will speak about a small group of practicing
lawyers, called the International Protection Center, working in Russia with its sister organization, Centre de la
Protection Internationale, based in Strasbourg, France, and about
how we do international litigation work for the victims of torture
and other abuses. One of our recent cases was this case that I
had many doubts that we could win. It shocked our legal community. What I was worried about in this case was that judges of
the [European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)] would never
believe that, in the 21st century, it is possible to rip twenty nails
from a person’s hands and feet one by one. Fortunately, their
cruelty went so far that they forced the prisoner to clean the
room, which was then covered in blood; after this, he hid the
nails in some place and later managed to take them. We brought
this evidence to the European Court. In response, the authorities
said that this is a kind of illness, nails fall out like leaves from
the trees. Thanks to this absurd position we won another case. It
is quite unbelievable but this small group has already won 200
cases before the European Court of Human Rights as well as
several cases before the UN Human Rights Committee.

Russian Prison & Detention System
Now, I would like to skip definitions and the structure of
bodies as well as the procedure for examination of complaints,
which have been discussed by previous speakers, and go directly
to an analysis of violations based on specific cases. I will start
with a couple of words on the Russian penitentiary system
because the largest number of the complaints by the Center
to the European Court of Human Rights concern Article 3 of
the European Convention of Human Rights,2 which deals with
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, the same area as
CAT. In Russia, there is an endemic and systemic problem of
inhuman treatment of prisoners, and since the Russian prison
population is so enormous—close to one million persons—this
problem takes on horrendous dimensions. In numerous cases,
the European Court, and also the UN Human Rights Committee
have recognized a violation—in everyday routine practice—of
the rights of prisoners.
Now, this violation was first recognized in the case Kalashnikov v. Russia in 2002,3 when I represented this case in the very
first public hearing of a Russian case before the ECtHR in September 2001. I had a chance to bring the attention of the Court to
the issue that people who are not yet convicted, but only accused
of committing a crime, are kept in more cruel conditions than
those who are being punished for a crime. And this uncovers a
great, immense prejudice in the attitude toward prisoners, toward

The mechanism of the [Convention against Torture (CAT)]1
opens up another area of activity for us. For example, the effectiveness of CAT can be demonstrated by the fact that after
many years of lobbying efforts by the Russian human rights
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those arrested, and toward those accused or suspected of having
committed a crime. In Russia, which carries the legacy of the
Soviet Union, some still believe the notion of Stalin, that those in
prison are to be treated as guilty. And this says a lot. This presents
a blatant violation of the constitutional right to presumption of
innocence. Were the courts taking the presumption of innocence
seriously, there could not be a situation where individuals in pretrial detention are held in worse conditions than those in colonies
and prisons after the conviction.

Comparing this practice to the judgments before the European Court of Human Rights, I would like to bring you examples
of the effectiveness of the ECtHR and the follow-up procedure.
Gladyshev v. Russia9 is one example to look at. Gladyshev called
from prison in secrecy, saying, “I am in the seventh year here in
prison without a judgment, and I might die here.” That was in the
middle of the night, and I said, “Don’t tell me these stupid things,
it is impossible,” and he said, “No, it is possible.” So we took up
the case and finally we won. Gladyshev insisted that all the truth
he’s asking for is a jury trial. But he was refused a jury trial. The
European Court decided that he was deprived of the right to a
trial, and recognized a violation of Article 6 of the Convention,10
which concerns trial guarantees. After that, the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation quashed all the judgments, sent this
case to a new trial, and Gladyshev obtained a jury trial, and the
jury came back with an acquittal. Of course, he waited for this
acquittal for eight years, but finally we can all agree that this was
an effective remedy. If he came to us earlier, if the convention
came to Russia earlier, it probably would have been even faster.

Today, more than ten years have passed after the Kalashnikov
judgment, and in 2012, with Ananyev4 and other cases, the Court
noted that ninety cases with the same substance were already
examined and another 250 repetitive cases are awaiting examination by the Court, and therefore the systemic problem in the Russian penitentiary system has been firmly recognized and stated
by the Court. However, if you say, as some people in Russia and
Europe have, that the Russian authorities didn’t do anything,
it would be wrong. They did a lot. They presented many documents demonstrating how they improved the prison conditions,
and still after a decade there is still the Ananyev case. It means
that this is a real, persistent problem. And this is 2013, the year
when the Russian Federation has to report to the Committee of
Ministers—the controlling executive board of the Council of
Europe—on what they have in reality done to improve the prison
conditions. If one has enforced a system, which tortures every
human, every person staying in pretrial detention, this is intolerable and inconsistent with minimum international standards for
the treatment of prisoners.

In another example, just recently, we litigated a case, Idalov v.
Russia,11 before the Grand Chamber [of the ECtHR] and won the
case. Russia was found in violation of, again, Article 6 trial guarantees. The judgment was very clear; it stipulated that the only
remedy for this case was a retrial of the case. With much doubt,
as I could see from the hearing of this case by the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, they quashed the judgments and we
are waiting for a new trial. I cannot say this will happen tomorrow, or that the trial of Idalov will avoid all of the mistakes that
were made in the initial trial, or that procedurally it’s going to
be correct. So it is not the ideal system, but it is much better
than the cases before the Human Rights Committee, where you
have the most just judgments saying that the person who is in a
life sentence colony is a victim of unfair trial, and he has to be
immediately released. I am waiting for this immediate release
for, let us see, over twenty years, as in the case of Gridin.12 And
I suffer, but nothing compares to his suffering. I have visited him
there, and he still believes that he will be released, he says, “I
have to be released and compensated.” And he said, “I don’t care
much about compensation, but it is so difficult to be here with a
charge of murder,” when he has never committed any murders.

Advocacy Before the European System and the UN
This is a proper place to speak about the difference between
our victories before the Human Rights Committee and UN treaty
bodies and before the European Court of Human Rights. When
you win a case before the European Court of Human Rights,
the state, according to Protocol 14,5 has to present within six
months to the Committee of Ministers concrete measures that
they took or are going to take in order to implement the judgment. However, unfortunately, there is no effective system for the
implementation of decisions in the UN. I do not know when it
was or who it was that explained to the Russian authorities—and
I’m afraid in other countries there exists the same problem—that
judgments of the European Court have to be implemented because they are binding but that decisions and views of the UN
treaty bodies are “just” recommendations. I don’t know who said
this first, but it is the general understanding among all Russian
authorities and it is impossible to overcome it. So every four
years, after the examination of the country reports to the ICCPR,6 [Russian authorities] say, “Thank you very much for your
attention to our internal problems, but unfortunately we cannot
implement this decision.” For example, as we repeatedly brought
the cases Lantsova7 and Gridin8 to the attention of the Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court decided in the same way as before the
decision and will most likely do so four years from now.

And here we come to the well-known case of Sergei Magnitsky,13 whose death in pretrial detention was the consequence
of inhuman treatment and torture. Possibly, if the Russian authorities had fully implemented the decision in the case of Lantsova
v. Russia,14 this death might have been avoided, because the Russian authorities would have recognized their positive obligation
concerning the right to life. However, non-implementation leads
to the repetition of violations of torture, and it even causes such
tremendous damage as loss of life.
Finally, I would like to mention a category of cases where
interim measures have been applied to prevent torture after an
extradition. [The European] Court and [the Human Rights]
Committee apply them quite rarely. But overall, these measures
have saved dozens of lives.
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authorities said they did not know who kidnapped this person.
But when Tajikistan reported before the Human Rights Committee in this case, it said that the Russian government handed over
Iskandarov to them in an official manner and presented relevant
documentation. By presenting this documentation, we were able
to prove to the ECtHR that the Russian authorities extradite persons in an undercover manner.

It is a very effective measure for persons who are facing extradition to a country where they might face inhuman treatment
or torture. They have a good chance not to be extradited, especially if they can present documents to the Court or Committee
showing the existence of torture in these circumstances in the
relevant country.
Although this measure has great potential in preventing torture and has proven effective in many instances, the practice can
also be disappointing at times, as in a recent case from 2012
decided by the [UN Committee against Torture] against Kazakhstan concerning extradition from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan.15
The Committee actually instructed Kazakhstan not to extradite
the person, but the country failed to follow this instruction and
finally the Committee found a violation of the right not to be
extradited where a person might be tortured. On the other hand,
we were successful with applying the interim measures before the
European Court. All states carefully follow instructions from the
European Court not to extradite a person to another country. Starting from Garabaev v. Russia,16 we have won several cases applying the interim measures and interim procedures according to Rule
39.17 Within this procedure, the European Court communicates
the case within 24 hours. And we saved—really saved—some of
these lives. This is the way to prevent potential torture.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to stress that much depends on our
activeness. But not everything we do yields results. Something
is really wrong with the UN system if so many countries, especially after the Russian Federation, a huge country and a member
of the Security Council, sets this bad example saying, “We are
not going to comply with these decisions because they are not
binding—they are just recommendations.” It is not possible to
take the Committee of Ministers to the Council, but at least it
is possible to appropriately educate the national authorities and
to establish and maintain an effective follow-up mechanism. As
much as the UN pushes countries to criminalize torture, it is just
as necessary to implement in national legislation norms that ensure the implementation of the decisions. It does make sense to
have in the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation
Articles 413 and 415,19 which oblige the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation to quash all the judgments in cases where the
European Court finds a violation of fair trial rights, but it does
not make sense not to have similar provisions concerning the
decisions of UN treaty bodies. It is unacceptable and the UN has
to act to promote compliance.

But since the Russian authorities now know exactly when they
are not allowed to extradite a person, they are doing the following, as is seen in the case of Iskandarov.18 They did not extradite
him, but they simply released him, and some unidentified people,
acting in the territory of the Russian Federation, as if on their
own, took him and brought him to Tajikistan. Then the Russian

Remarks of Christian M. De Vos*
Introduction
As Gerald [Staberock] already noted, the topic of this panel
is “Challenges in the Implementation of CAT Decisions,” which
is an issue that my organization, the Open Society Justice Initiative, has engaged with quite closely for several years now. The
Justice Initiative, for those who are not familiar, engages in litigation around the world before the UN treaty bodies, including
the Committee against Torture (CAT), as well as the regional human rights systems and several sub-regional courts. In so doing,
we represent applicants, we intervene as a third party, and we
also provide technical assistance to local counsel. Like many
litigators, we have a specific interest in learning how to make
our litigation more effective, including through the full and
expeditious implementation of judgments. Indeed, implementation is one of the greatest challenges of our work, as it is
for so many other organizations, ranging from international
NGOs to local human rights groups, which struggle to ensure
that the lofty principles articulated in Geneva or Strasbourg or

* Christian M. De Vos is an Advocacy Officer at the Open Society
Justice Initiative and author of the new report “From Rights to
Remedies: Structures and Strategies for Implementing Human Rights
Decisions.” He is an alumnus of the American University Washington
College of Law.
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Racial Discrimination] has adopted final decisions on the merits in
the same number, finding violations in eleven, three of which the
committee has determined were satisfactorily implemented.24
Comparatively, then, CAT is doing quite well, even if a sixty
percent compliance rate is itself a sobering statistic.

Washington, D.C., find their way into the policies and practices of states. To that end, the Justice Initiative published in
2010 a report called “From Judgment to Justice,”20 which
sought to take measure of the degree to which states comply
with decisions issued by regional human rights courts and UN
treaty bodies and the various follow-up procedures that exist
to oversee their execution. The overriding conclusion was that,
while these systems vary in sophistication and scale, they all
confront, to varying degrees, an implementation deficit that
needs to be taken seriously.

Structure and Implementation
by UN Treaty Bodies
At present, all treaty bodies that are empowered to receive
individual communications have also instituted follow-up
procedures. The Human Rights Committee was the first body to
do so when, in 1990, it created the position of Special Rapporteur
for Follow-Up on Views, with a two-year renewable mandate to
monitor state implementation of decisions. In 2002, the Committee
Against Torture also designated a rapporteur for follow-up to Article 22 decisions. According to the terms of reference for follow-up
rapporteurs, their mandate includes, in theory, the following activities: 1) monitoring compliance with Committee decisions, which
entails communicating with States Parties to inquire about what
measures they have taken or intend to take to execute the decision;
2) recommending appropriate action States Parties might take to
satisfy the terms of a decision; 3) meeting with representatives of
permanent missions of States Parties to encourage compliance; 4)
determining where technical assistance by the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights would be appropriate; and
5) conducting (again, theoretically) follow-up visits in-country.25

Remedies for individuals, and general reforms to policy
or institutional practice, are not easily won, even in domestic
jurisdictions, and so pursuing such litigation in international
and regional fora might strike some as fanciful. Perhaps such
skepticism does not extend to the people gathered here today
but it must be said that these systems are relatively new, they
have fewer resources, and they rest on less-settled juridical
foundations than their domestic counterparts. These are all very
compelling reasons why implementation is challenging, to say
nothing of the nuisance such decisions pose to governments,
who might otherwise carry out human rights abuses unchecked
by the judgment of an independent body.

Successes of the Committee against Torture
In spite of these obstacles, the number of cases filed and
decisions delivered by these bodies, including the Committee
against Torture, continues to increase. According to the CAT’s
most recent report, since 1989 the Committee has registered 506
complaints against 31 States Parties.21 Of those, the Committee
has adopted final decisions on the merits in 203 complaints
and found violations in 73 of them. A total of 102 complaints
remain pending for consideration, a backlog that has continued to
grow. These numbers also track an increase in communications
procedures throughout the UN treaty body system. Presently,
four other committees can receive communications, and two
more—the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—have procedures that have recently, or will soon, come into effect. Let me
take a few minutes to provide some more figures and, for those
who are unfamiliar, sketch out how UN treaty bodies generally
seek to support the implementation of their decisions. I will then
turn to the challenges and opportunities that exist with respect to
implementation at the national level.

Generally speaking, states are expected to reply to a committee’s decision within six months, explaining how they intend
to implement a remedial scheme. However, many states do not
reply, and many that do often take the opportunity to contest the
factual basis of the committee’s decision or to challenge its interpretation of the respective convention. Unfortunately, as it is true
of the international human rights regime more generally, there
are few sanctions available to the committee when states fail to
comply. Naming and shaming is one option, of course, but the
only public information that is kept on these cases and the status
of their implementation is, to my knowledge, found in the annual
report that each treaty body presents to the General Assembly.
So, to our earlier conversation about the importance of publicity,
this tool is used far less effectively than it could be. I want to
add one caveat here: the figures I am offering reflect the assessments of the treaty bodies and follow-up rapporteurs themselves,
with which reasonable minds may very well disagree. Indeed, the
Justice Initiative recently experienced this in the context of an
ethnic profiling case it helped litigate before the Human Rights
Committee against Spain.26 There were manifest deficiencies in
the government’s response and our follow-up letters received
no substantive reply, so it was with some surprise that we later
learned, only by happening to read a newsletter of the OHCHR
Treaties Division, that the case had actually been closed and in
fact publicized as an example of successful implementation.
That offers some picture into the struggles that victims and their
representatives face, just at the level of communicating with the
UN secretariat in Geneva.

It is worth noting that CAT decisions enjoy the highest compliance rate: nearly sixty percent as compared to other treaty
bodies. It is also the only other treaty body to have adjudicated a
relatively large number of communications. The largest, by far,
is the Human Rights Committee, which, according to its most
recent figures, has adjudicated 914 cases to date;22 however, the
compliance rate with those decisions is significantly lower than
CAT’s. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) has registered about 30 communications to date,23 and CERD [Convention on the Elimination of
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Unfortunately, the Petitions Unit of the High Commissioner’s
Challenges to Implementation
office—the body that services the committees and assists in
Let me now turn briefly to identifying what we see as some of
all the mundane but essential tasks that effective follow-up
the biggest challenges for implementing treaty body decisions.
requires—is starved for funds. The current capacity they have
One enduring challenge is their contested legal status. Dean
to facilitate follow-up to communications was described to me
Grossman referred to individual communications earlier as a
as the equivalent of “less than half a person.” Moreover, while
“semi-judicial” procedure and certainly a number of legal comthe mandate of follow-up rapporteurs allows them to, in theory,
mentators have persuasively argued that states, having accepted
carry out meetings with states on an inter-sessional basis or even
the jurisdiction of the treaty bodies to adjudicate individual
conduct follow-up visits in country, in practice, this very rarely
complaints, are duty-bound to respect those decisions, and not
happens. The one and only follow-up visit that the HRC conto act in contravention of them.27 These arguments have largely
ducted, for instance, was fifteen years ago. Moreover, by and
failed to persuade states, however, many of which merely contest
large meetings with states that are carried out by the rapporteur
committee findings and insist that they are not legally obligated
only take place when the committee itself is in session, so only
to implement them. That said, we have seen cases where states
three times per year. More can and should be done to improve
will abide by a decision but make clear that they are not doing
the treaty-bodies’ follow-up procedures. For instance, the
so as a matter of legal duty; similarly, where compensation has
Human Rights Committee has only one follow-up rapporteur
been paid, states will often explicitly state that it is being done
for its many cases—numbering well into the hundreds—rather
on an ex gratia basis.
than assigning multiple committee members to conduct follow
up, as committees like CEDAW do. It is my understanding that
Another important element to mention is remedies. In
CAT’s Rules of Procedure similarly permit the appointment
the CAT’s case, the nature of the communications it receives
of multiple follow-up rapporteurs for communication; howlikely plays a key part in its above-average implementation rate.
ever, like the HRC, only one rapporteur presently works in this
Unlike the Human Rights Committee, which receives a large
capacity. I would also echo the remarks of earlier speakers that
number of complaints that span the Covenant, the vast majority
committees really need to think creatively about increasing comof the communications CAT has received concern allegations
munication with other human rights mechanisms as part of their
that the petitioner’s deportation or extradition would breach
follow-up duties. Special procedures, particularly whose remit
the respondent state’s non-refoulement obligation under Article
complements that of a particular treaty body can be useful in
3. Now this is slowly changing, I think: you can read through
this regard. For CAT, this would be the Special Rapporteur on
the CAT’s recent annual reports and see a rise in the number
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
of Article 1 and Article 16 cases. But certainly, with respect to
Punishment; for CEDAW, it might be the Special Rapporteur
Article 3 complaints, the actions that a state must undertake (or
on Violence Against Women. The process of Universal Periodic
not undertake) are much clearer than the remedies that might be
Review is also an important tool, but unfortunately it has only
appropriate in more complex litigation. Clarity of remedies is
given passing attention to the implementation of treaty body
also quite important. As an example, empirical evidence comdecisions thus far.
ing out of the Inter-American System supports the contention
of many civil society advocates that the more precise a court’s
My last word on the UN: I want to underscore how crucial
remedial language is, the greater the influence it has on state
the financial picture here is, since this dimension is too often
compliance.28 It makes it more difficult for states to avoid taking
obscured in these more legal discussions. The General Assemaction and better arms advocates, who can use the judgment as a
bly—a political body if there ever there was one—is in charge
basis to press for implementation.
of allocating the budget to the treaty bodies and can effectively
choke the system by not providing it with adequate funds. As
Finally, follow-up is crucial. Generally speaking, successful
the number of States Parties and procedures continue to grow
implementation, we have found, occurs in cases with high
and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’
political visibility and a strong civil society presence capable of
budget has been further reduced, this becomes a real risk. In
complementing the committee’s follow-up efforts and applying
this context, I should say, we are also entering the second stretch
other domestic pressures. For instance, in reading through the
of an ongoing, inter-governmental treaty-body “strengthening
CAT’s most recent annual report, one case worth highlighting
process” in which a number of states have increasingly sought
is its 2006 decision against Senegal concerning its failure for
to push back against what they argue are “non-mandated” activimany years to prosecute the former dictator of Chad, Hissène
ties of the treaty bodies, which, they insist, includes follow-up
Habré.29 The Committee played an important role in pushing for
activities. So this process really threatens to weaken these proHabré’s prosecution. Indeed, it had been conducting follow-up
cedures and to more generally interfere with the independence
on the case throughout 2011, a point that the International Court
of committees and their ability to determine their own working
of Justice made note of when it issued its decision the following
methods, including their engagement with NGOs. Those states
year, also holding that Senegal was obligated to prosecute or
that are leading this negative agenda also see gain in dragging the
extradite Habré.30
process on, leaving the treaty body system in perpetual limbo. So
we should not forget the political side of this discussion.
28
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implementation a priority. Moreover, executive ministries freImplementation at the Domestic Level
quently lack established frameworks for communication and
I am going to now turn from the international scene and say a
cooperation. Implementation, particularly in complex cases,
few words about the national level, since after all, it is states that
engages the competencies of multiple agencies and departments,
are responsible for implementing these decisions. The Justice
but their joint efforts are too often characterized by disorganiInitiative will soon be publishing a follow-up report to “From
zation and delay. A second and related problem is that of poJudgment to Justice” that looks particularly at the way in which
litical will to implement. Political will is essential, but it is not
states go about executing international decisions at the national
something that can be summoned just by invoking it; it has to
level. The report, called “From Rights to Remedies,” examines
be nurtured, and building domestic structures can facilitate that
what sort of frameworks, structures, and mechanisms exist at the
process. At the same time, it is important that the mere presence
national level to facilitate (or thwart) implementation.31 Three
of the mechanisms I just mentioned not be mistaken for political
overall conclusions inform the report’s findings. First, despite
will. As the report demonstrates, a state can have the most sothe large number of states that have accepted the jurisdiction
phisticated structures at its disposal but without a genuine comof international courts and treaty-bodies, the domestic inframitment by key political actors to implementation, their promise
structure needed to ensure implementation of their decisions
will remain illusory. The appearance of compliance is not the
remains very underdeveloped. On the positive side, attention
same as actual compliance, even though many governments may
to domestic implementation structures has gained increasing
try to make us think that they are.
ground in a number of different regional systems. Indeed, improved implementation is a key pillar of ongoing reform efforts
Lastly—and I commend CAT’s General Comment 3 in this
for the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Euregard; it really hits the nail on the head—when thinking about
rope’s Committee of Ministers—the political body that oversees
implementation, we need to focus on the multiple organs within
implementation—has recommended that Member States design
a state, not just the executive but the legislature and the judiciary
a range of mechanisms to ensure efficient domestic capacity for
as well. Implementation involves disparate state actors who
the execution of Strasbourg judgments. Some states have sought
operate in different institutional settings and often have different
to develop such mechanisms as well, including the formation
or competing political interests, yet too often discussions are
of high-level inter-ministerial committees and working groups,
confined to the level of the executive alone. Such disagreements
the establishment of standing parliamentary human rights comare not an excuse for noncompliance, but a crucial recommendation
mittees, focal points for implementation within the executive
of the report is the need for states to better structure the multiple
branch, the passage of enabling legislation, and direct enforcepoints at which implementation occurs and for advocates to
ment through national court systems in some cases.
think strategically about where pressure can best be applied. No
one is better placed to do this than the activists and organizations
Unfortunately, these approaches remain the exception to
who work on human rights at the national level, as they are the
what is otherwise an ad hoc process, managed largely by midones who understand the political situations and structures of
level bureaucrats who lack sufficient political authority to make
their country best.

Remarks of Elsy Chemurgor Sainna*
Introduction

M

y presentation is based on implementing the UN
Convention against Torture in Kenya,32 and, from the
outset, I must begin by mentioning that Kenya is not
a State Party to the Optional Protocol,33 which means we cannot
bring cases before the Committee against Torture. But, with that
said, there are other ways in which we are trying to promote the
fight against torture in Kenya. Before I embark on my remarks,
I want to tell you a little bit about the International Commission

* Elsy Chemurgor Sainna represented the International Commission of
Jurists, Kenyan Chapter. Currently, she is a Fellow with the Leadership
and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) Program at the Georgetown
University Law Center.
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of Jurists, Kenyan Chapter, (ICJ Kenya)34 in two minutes: we are
a membership organization consisting of members of the Bench
and Bar and are keen on promoting human rights and the rule
of law in Kenya, as well as in Africa and, as Gerald [Staberock]
has said, we have litigated previously around Africa on issues of
human rights, particularly international political and civil rights.
My presentation today is based on three objectives: one, I want
to provide you with a bit of Kenya’s compliance with human
rights treaty mechanisms and its responses to concluding observations by the Committee against Torture. Since I cannot talk
about decisions before the Committee, I opted for the concluding
observations because this is what has led us to where we are
today in Kenya. Secondly, I also want to contextualize for you
the constitutional and political situation in regards to the international human rights treaties. And finally, I want to highlight some
of the challenges and opportunities that have been mentioned by
my colleague in regards to engaging with the treaty bodies, not
only at a national, but also at the regional working level because
that is where we have taken cases to the African Commission.

is why the Special Rapporteur visited Kenya, in response to
that. For example, in the western region of Kenya, known as the
Mount Elgon region, there were increasing incidents of a militia
that were terrorizing the residents. The conflict stemmed from
land disputes amongst communities living in that area. The government decided to respond by deploying the military in order
to curb the militia operations. But in the end, the military ended
up perpetrating torture and enforced disappearances against residents. There are documented cases that illustrate what the military government did to violate human rights in an attempt to fight
the militia.36 The Committee was concerned about the failure to
investigate these allegations of torture, and particularly that the
security personnel had not been taken to task. These are simply
highlights. Obviously there were other, more important issues in
the Concluding Observations. Nonetheless, it is important just in
the context of discussing litigation.

Kenya’s Legal and Political Context
I am sure you know we have just recently held our 2013
general elections. We have come from a very uneasy situation in
Kenya. But luckily, unlike in 2007, we did not have post-election
violence. However, we still have the [International Criminal
Court] matter hanging over our heads, as both the current head
of state and the deputy president are actually accused before the
International Criminal Court. So, it is a very interesting situation
in Kenya.

Kenya’s Engagement with the Human Rights
Mechanisms
Kenya made its report to the Committee against Torture
in 2002. Based on the Concluding Observations of 2002, ICJ
Kenya’s advocacy began to discuss what could be done about
implementing some of the Concluding Observations that were
given by the Committee. We were also reviewed by the Human
Rights Committee in July last year, and our focus was also on the
issue of torture. More importantly, we have made other presentations before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women and also to the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination. We had a special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary execution, Professor Philip Alston,
who came to Kenya during a very critical time, just after the
post-election violence. Kenya also submitted its second periodic
universal review last year in November. It is coming up for another review before the Committee against Torture at the end of
May 2013. So, in other words, Kenya has engaged at the reporting level, not necessarily on cases before the committee bodies.
And finally, at the regional level, Kenya has not actively engaged
with compliance review mechanisms at the African Commission
level. In my view, we have paid lip service, if I may put it that
way, in implementing the African Charter.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier on, Kenya is not a State
Party to the Optional Protocol; we do not recognize the jurisdiction of the Committee with respect to individual complaints.
And at a regional level, which is the African Commission level,
there are options to file complaints, but you must obviously have
exhausted all local remedies. I will give you an example of a
case that was filed before the Commission: the Endorois Land
Community Case, in which a decision was given in March 2010.
There was a lot of celebration after the decision was rendered,
despite the fact that the case went before the Commission at a
very difficult time, when the judicial system was perceived as
weak and not responsive. The community was able to demonstrate that they had exhausted local judicial remedies by trying to
get the matter adjudicated before the local courts without much
success. They did not feel like they would “obtain” justice.
Kenya has moved on since the very turbulent times after
2007, and in 2008 it ushered in the constitutional review process.
We now have a new constitution, which was promulgated in
2010.37 We have changed the state from a being a dualist to a
monist state, which means that any [treaty] law that Kenya
ratifies becomes part of our domestic law. However, the constitution requires that we must have legislation that gives us the
process for how to actually go about ratifying a particular human
rights treaty.

What do the Concluding Observations of 2008
Say About Kenya?
One is that Kenya should introduce national legislation in
order to define torture and provide for appropriate remedies in
line with Article 1 of the Convention. Secondly, the Committee
was very concerned that there is a common practice of unlawful
arrests and detention, particularly by the police. When arrests
happen, there are statistics that demonstrate that the law enforcement bodies and agencies actually were taking into detention
mainly people in the urban slum areas. [The victims] are beaten
and subjected to torture, cruel, or degrading treatment. There
are also widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings.35 That

At the same time, we are undergoing judicial reforms. The
institutional reform of the judiciary is very vibrant at the
moment. We have seen an emergence of an independent
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reasonable decision in their favor were not favorable. The East
African Court of Justice is a regional court of the East African
States. The case was filed in 2010; it took the court about two
years to conclude the matter, and in March this year we got our
judgment. Obviously the judgment was not in favor of the victims. We felt that the court focused more on technicalities rather
than substantive issues of human rights violations. The case was
dismissed as the judges held that that the application was out
of time and that the argument that violations by the state were
“continuous” was not tenable

judiciary, not only from the executive but also from the legislature, and currently we have a vetting process for judicial officers.
Vetting of judges has been finalized. Some judges were found
unsuitable to serve on various grounds, including violating
human rights in their adjudication. This has paved way for
recruitment of new judicial officers in line with the requirements
of the new institution.
The police reform, which was part of the Concluding Observations in 2008 and constitutional reform, has also just begun.
The police are under a new legal framework and there has been
established a system of civil oversight for the police in Kenya.
The oversight authority will monitor police action and complaints
lodged by members of the public concerning any particular human rights violations and whether torture against civilians is being conducted, because the police are among the bodies known
to be the highest perpetrators of the crime of torture, particularly
in areas of detention, during arrests, and extra-judicial killings.

Obviously, this posed a challenge for both ICJ Kenya and
IMLU, but we did not give up. We have now submitted a communication before the African Commission. When we looked
at the judgment, we concluded that the [East African] Court [of
Justice] took a very technical approach, stating that the case was
filed outside the restricted timelines established by the East African Treaty, which is normally three months, despite the evidence
of gross violations. And the Court, as I said, did not address the
substance of the issues that were raised in the application. Despite
the outcome of the decision, we were compelled to think about
other options. If the national court failed, we would go to the
regional court. We started with the East African Court of Justice;
we have failed, so now we are going to the African Commission.
At the African Commission we are advocating the same—that
there has been an attempt, but even going to the local courts the
remedy is not sufficient to compensate the victims of torture. So
it’s a case-by-case battle and before the Commission we are still
advocating our position. We still have a long way to go.

We have very specific provisions on access to justice which
are contained in the Constitution and a very progressive Bill of
Rights, but the key question again remains: implementation.
In terms of torture protection specifically, it is provided for
in our Constitution as a non-derogable right. But defining torture
is still an issue. Whereas torture is prohibited by the Constitution, it is not defined. A draft bill, which has yet to be enacted,
was drafted in collaboration with other civil society actors, the
ministry of justice, and a national human rights body, actually
provides for the definition of torture according to Article 1 of
the Convention. Will it be passed? I don’t know, and that is a
challenge. Therefore, even bringing cases before the courts, one
simply relies on constitutional provision and fundamental rights
and freedoms.

Conclusion
In terms of utilizing the human rights mechanisms, as I said
in our communication before the African Commission, we were
seeking remedies for the Mount Elgon victims. The main challenge obviously, as you have seen, is implementing the decision
after. So what happens when the decision, for example, is given in
our favor? As illustrated with the community land case, which is
famously referred to as the “Endorois Communication”Case,39
where a decision was made in favor of the community, to date
the implementation of the decision has still not been done.

The practice of torture continues to be part of the culture of
the police. It is still very widespread. Although there has been a
reduction in reported incidents, they are not significant, but the
reduction can be attributed to some of the rights included in the
Constitution. You find reported cases in areas, particularly now
new forms of torture emerging in the health care systems, areas
of detention, and particularly the prison departments.

Be that as it may, we will continue conducting policy meetings, particularly along the Robben Island Guidelines40 that
were developed by the African Commission in regards to getting African states to put in place regulations that will prohibit
torture in their operations. We still intend on promoting policy
dialogues with the government to ratify the Optional Protocol
to the Convention. Perhaps they will give serious consideration
to individual complaints before the Committee against Torture.

The most important point, which brings me almost to the
close, is the accountability for victims of torture. This has yet to
be realized despite the new Constitution. At the moment, there
exists a communication pending before the African Commission
that ICJ Kenya filed on behalf of victims of Mount Elgon.38
These point to the Concluding Observations of 2008, where the
Committee observed that the state had failed to investigate those
allegations of human rights violations. As part of its litigation
strategy, ICJ Kenya opted to file an amicus curie brief in a case
lodged at the East African Court of Justice by the Independent
Medico Legal Unit (IMLU). IMLU is ICJ Kenya’s collaborative
partner. The idea was to try to expand avenues for justice because
at the time our judicial system was very weak, and if you sought
redress for victims or communities, the chances of getting a

In conclusion, what I might say is that we remain optimistic. We are on the path toward institutional reform and we are
transforming the justice system. We have come a long way and
are optimistic that the new constitution is a good framework
to continue our fight for the redress of victims of human rights
violations.
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